Force majeure events and stock market reactions in Ukraine by Caporale, M.G. et al.
“Force majeure events and stock market reactions in Ukraine”
AUTHORS
Guglielmo Maria Caporale
Alex Plastun https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8208-7135
https://publons.com/researcher/1449372/alex-plastun/
Inna Makarenko https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7326-5374
https://publons.com/researcher/2455969/inna-makarenko/
ARTICLE INFO
Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Alex Plastun and Inna Makarenko (2019). Force
majeure events and stock market reactions in Ukraine. Investment Management
and Financial Innovations, 16(1), 334-345. doi:10.21511/imfi.16(1).2019.26
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.16(1).2019.26
RELEASED ON Monday, 01 April 2019
RECEIVED ON Tuesday, 05 March 2019
ACCEPTED ON Wednesday, 27 March 2019
LICENSE
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License
JOURNAL "Investment Management and Financial Innovations"
ISSN PRINT 1810-4967
ISSN ONLINE 1812-9358
PUBLISHER LLC “Consulting Publishing Company “Business Perspectives”
FOUNDER LLC “Consulting Publishing Company “Business Perspectives”
NUMBER OF REFERENCES
29
NUMBER OF FIGURES
0
NUMBER OF TABLES
23
© The author(s) 2019. This publication is an open access article.
businessperspectives.org
334
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 16, Issue 1, 2019
http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.16(1).2019.26
Abstract
This paper examines reactions in the Ukrainian stock market to force majeure events, 
which are divided into four groups: economic force majeure, social force majeure, ter-
rorist acts, natural and technological disasters. More specifically, using daily data for 
the main Ukrainian stock market index (namely PFTS) over the period from January 
1, to December 31, 2018 this study investigates whether or not force majeure events 
create (temporary) inefficiencies and there exist profitable trading strategies based on 
exploiting them. For this purpose, cumulative abnormal returns and trading simula-
tion approaches are used in addition to Student’s t-tests. The results suggest that the 
Ukrainian stock market absorbs new information rather fast. Negative returns in most 
cases are observed only on the day of the event. The only exception is technological 
disasters, the market needing up to ten days to react fully in this case. Despite the 
presence of a detectable pattern in price behavior after force majeure events (namely, a 
price decrease on the day of the event) no profitable trading strategies based on it are 
found as their outcomes do not differ from those generated by random trading. 
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INTRODUCTION
The Efficient Market Hypothesis EMH (see Fama, 1970) is still the 
dominant theoretical paradigm for understanding the behavior of 
asset markets. However, the empirical literature has provided plenty 
of evidence that is inconsistent with market efficiency in the form of 
various anomalies (including calendar and size ones), over-reactions 
and under-reactions, persistence, fat tails in the distribution of asset 
returns, etc. One possible explanation for (temporary) inefficiencies is 
the arrival of unexpected new information, whilst earnings announce-
ments are normally scheduled and therefore markets are ready to re-
act to them (Foster, 1973; Chambers & Penman, 1984; Falk & Levy, 
1989; Lonie et al., 1996; Cready & Gurun, 2010; Syed & Bajwa, 2018, 
etc.), force majeure events (such as technological and natural disasters, 
terrorist acts, unexpected economic events, etc.) are by their nature 
unpredictable and could have a significant impact on stock markets, 
especially in the case of major shocks such as the 9/11 attacks in the 
US or the result of the Brexit referendum. 
This paper analyzes the specific case of the Ukrainian stock market 
with the aim of investigating whether or not force majeure events cre-
ate (temporary) inefficiencies and there exist profitable trading strat-
egies based on exploiting them. For this purpose, cumulative abnor-
mal returns and trading simulation approaches are used in addition 
to Student’s t-tests. The analysis is carried out for four different types 
of force majeure events: economic force majeure, social force majeure, 
terrorist acts, natural and technological disasters.
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The layout of the paper is the following: section 1 contains a brief literature review, section 2 describes 
the data and methodology, section 3 presents the empirical results, final section provides some conclud-
ing remarks. 
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
Event studies are often carried out to examine the 
impact of some specific events on stock markets 
(Ball & Brown, 1968; Fama et al., 1969; MacKinlay, 
1997; de Jong et al., 1992; Corrado, 2011). A lot 
of papers focus on earning announcements on 
market variables (Falk & Levy, 1989; Cready & 
Gurun, 2010; Syed & Bajwa, 2018). Other studies 
analyze instead the effects of dividend announce-
ments (Lonie et al., 1996), earnings per share an-
nouncements (Foster, 1973), earnings announce-
ments through timeliness of reporting disclosure 
(Chambers & Penman, 1984). 
Force majeure events are unexpected and there-
fore cannot be incorporated into asset prices in 
advance. As a result, they could create conditions 
for obtaining abnormal profits until the new in-
formation has been completely absorbed by mar-
ket participants. In addition to the traditional list 
of natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, hurri-
canes), social, military and political events (ter-
rorist attacks, mass riots, protest actions), tech-
nological and aviation accidents, some economic 
events (such as unexpected bankruptcies of com-
panies and financial institutions, cyberattacks to 
the commercial sector, etc.) can also be considered 
as force majeure events.
Numerous studies have examined the response 
of stock markets to terrorist acts: in the SAARC 
countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) in 
2000–2015 (Chaudhry et al., 2018); in Indonesia, 
Israel, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and the UK in 
2002–2006 (Arin et al., 2008); in 22 countries 
in 1994–2004 (Drakos, 2010); in 25 countries in 
1994–2005 (Karolyi & Martell, 2010). Chen and 
Siems (2004), Karolyi and Martell (2010), Brounen 
and Derwall (2010) used a common event study 
methodology to investigate the impact of terror-
ism on various stock markets.
As for the impact of natural disasters, evidence 
for Australia is provided by Worthington (2004, 
2010), for Canada by Laplante and Lanoie (1994), 
for Japan and the US by Wang and Kutan (2013). 
Unlike natural disasters, which normally affect 
individual countries, technological disasters are 
industry related. These include the explosions in 
chemical plants and refineries worldwide in 1990–
2005 (Capelle-Blancard & Laguna, 2009); the nu-
clear disaster in Fukushima-Daiichi causing ab-
normal returns for Japanese, French and German 
nuclear utilities (Ferstl et al., 2012); 209 energy 
accidents in 1907–2007 without a significant im-
pact on stock markets (Scholtens & Boersen, 2011); 
aviation disaster announcements causing market 
losses and higher stock volatility (Kaplanski & 
Levy, 2008).
Regarding the effects of economic events, 
Campbell et al. (2003) investigated negative stock 
market reactions to information security breaches, 
and Knight and Pretty (1999) the impact of 15 cor-
porate catastrophes on stock prices their volatility, 
and trading volumes.
Additional studies considered the impact of 
various force majeure events. Hanabusa (2010) 
showed that the 9/11 terrorist attacks had a sig-
nificant effect on the stock prices of Japanese 
companies, whilst the Iraq War and Hurricane 
Katrina did not. Baker and Bloom (2013) used a 
panel including stock prices and volatilities for 
60 countries over the period 1970–2012 to in-
vestigate the impact of natural disasters, terror-
ist attacks and unexpected political shocks on 
economic growth through stock market proxies. 
Tavor and Teitler-Regev (2019) examined 344 
significant effects of natural disasters, artificial 
disasters and terrorism on the stock market us-
ing the Pessimism Index. Karolyi and Martell 
(2010) compared stock market reactions to 77 
terrorist attacks with those to extreme events 
such as financial crashes (4) and natural ca-
tastrophes (19). Below we also consider a varie-
ty of unexpected force majeure events to assess 
their impact on the Ukrainian stock market in 
particular. 
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2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The Ukrainian stock market index, namely the 
PFTS, is used for the empirical analysis. The 
sample period goes from January 1, 1997 to 
December 31, 2018. The frequency is daily. As 
already mentioned, force majeure events are di-
vided into four categories: economic, techno-
logical and natural disasters, terrorist acts in 
Ukraine during 1997–2018. A full list of force 
majeure events and their description is provid-
ed in Appendices A-D. 
The following hypotheses are then tested:
H1: Force majeure events create temporary inef-
ficiencies in the Ukrainian stock market. 
H2: Trading strategies based on force majeure 
events can generate abnormal profits.
To test them, we use the following methods:
• cumulative abnormal returns approach;
• Student’s t-tests;
• trading simulation approach.
The cumulative abnormal returns approach is 
based on MacKinlay (1997) and is standard for 
event studies. Abnormal returns are defined as 
follows:
( ) ,t t tAR R E R= −  (1)
where tR  is the daily return of the PFTS index 
over the period t  and ( )tE R  is the average re-
turn over the sample period.
Returns tR  are computed as follows:
1
1 100%,ii
i
Close
R
Close −
 = − ⋅  
 (2)
where iR  are returns on the і-th day in %, 1iClose −  
is close price on the 1i −  day, iClose  is close price 
on the і-th day.
( )tE R  is calculated as follows:
( )
1
1
,
N
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i
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T =
= ∑  (3)
where T  is the sample size.
The mean abnormal return corresponding to force 
majeure events on day α  denoted as  ARα  is the 
sum of the individual abnormal returns on that 
day divided by the number of force majeure events:
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where N  is the number of force majeure events. 
The cumulative abnormal return for the PFTS in-
dex from day to day denoted as ( )1 2,iCAR α α  
is simply the sum of the daily abnormal returns 
from day 1α  to day 2 :α
( ) 2
1
1 2 ,  
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α
α α
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=
= ∑  (5)
The sample average cumulative abnormal return 
for event observations from 1α  to 2α  denoted as ( )1 2,iCAR α α  is the sum of the mean abnormal 
return from day 1α  to day 2 :α
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These abnormal returns are cumulated over 1, 2, 3, 
5, and 10 days following the force majeure event 
considered by adding them up over these periods. 
Negative cumulative abnormal returns are evi-
dence in favor of Hypothesis 1.
Parametric t-tests are also carried out for 
Hypothesis 1. The Null Hypothesis (H0) is that 
the data (returns after force majeure events and 
over the full sample) belong to the same popula-
tion, a rejection of the null suggesting the presence 
of a statistical anomaly in the price behavior after 
force majeure events. The test is carried out at the 
95% confidence level, and the degrees of freedom 
are 1N −  (N being equal to N
1 
+ N
2
). 
To test H2, a trading strategy based on force ma-
jeure events is used to establish whether or not it 
can generate abnormal profits. The trading simu-
lation approach replicates the actions of the trader 
according to a given algorithm. In this particular 
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case, the algorithm is the following: open a short 
position in the Ukrainian stock market right after 
the force majeure event and hold it for a specific 
period of time. 
The percentage result of the individual deal is 
computed as follows:
100%
% result  ,close
open
P
P
⋅=  (7)
where openP  – opening price, closeP  – closing price. 
The sum of the results from each deal is the total 
financial result of trading. A strategy producing 
positive total profits implies that there exists an 
exploitable market anomaly.
Another important indicator of trading strategy ef-
ficiency is the percentage of successful trades:
% successful  trades  
100% number of successful trades
,
overall number of  trades
=
⋅=  (8)
To check the statistical difference of the results 
from random ones, t-tests are used. They compare 
the means from two samples to establish whether 
or not they come from the same population. The 
first sample consists of the trading results based 
on Hypothesis 2, and the second one of random 
trading results. 
If there are statistically significant differences, it is 
concluded that trading strategy really generate ab-
normal profits. Otherwise there are no advantages 
from exploiting this strategy.
It should be mentioned that the trading simula-
tion approach used in this paper does not incor-
porate transaction costs (spread, fees to the broker 
or bank, swaps, etc.).
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive statistics for the PFST returns over the 
period of analysis are provided in Table 1. The se-
ries is rather volatile, as indicated by the size of 
standard deviation and minimum/maximum val-
ues; its mean return is consistent with random 
walk behavior.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the PFST 
returns over the period 1997–2018
Number of observations 5,226
Mean 0.000519
Median 0.000552
Sum 2.710888
Minimum –0.159017
Maximum 0.276746
Variance 0.000385
Std. dev. 0.019609
Standard error 0.000271
Skewness 0.569882
Kurtosis 19.28168
First we calculate the cumulative abnormal re-
turns in the case of economic force majeure events; 
the results are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2. Cumulative abnormal returns for the 
PFST index over the period 1997–2018: economic 
force majeure events
Parameter/period 1 2 3 5 10
Mean abnormal return 
across force majeure 
event on day α  –0.59% 1.24% –0.08% 0.15% 0.01%
Cumulative abnormal 
return across event 
observations from 
1
α  to day 2α
–4.73% 5.15% 4.50% 8.52% 12.49%
Average cumulative 
abnormal return across 
event observations 
from 
1
α  to day 2α
–0.59% 0.64% 0.56% 1.07% 1.56%
As can be seen, there appears to be a negative re-
action of the stock market only on the day of the 
event, when cumulative abnormal returns, as well 
as mean abnormal returns, are negative. Over 
longer time horizons (2, 5 and 10 days after force 
majeure event), there is no evidence of a market 
drop. 
To establish whether the effect of economic force 
majeure events is statistically significant, t-tests 
are carried out (see Table 3).
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Table 3. T-test for the PFST returns over the 
period 1997–2018: economic force majeure 
events
Parameter/
period α 1 2 3 5 10
Mean return 
across force 
majeure event on 
day α
–0.54% 0.37% 0.24% 0.26% 0.21%
Standard deviation 
of returns across 
force majeure 
event on day α
1.34% 2.39% 1.97% 1.70% 1.30%
Mean return for 
the whole data set 
0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
Standard deviation 
of returns for the 
whole data set 
1.96% 1.96% 1.96% 1.96% 1.96%
The size of the 
data set across 
force majeure 
event on day α
8 16 24 40 80
The size of the 
whole data set
5,226 5,226 5,226 5,226 5,226
t-criterion –1.25 0.38 0.27 0.35 0.34
t-critical (0.95) 1.89 1.75 1.71 1.68 1.66
Null Hypothesis
Not 
rejected
Not 
rejected
Not 
rejected
Not 
rejected
Not 
rejected
The Null Hypothesis is not rejected, which implies 
that the behavior of returns after economic force 
majeure events does not statistically differ from 
their usual one. 
As for Hypothesis 2, Table 2 indicates a market 
drop only on the day of the event, but the size 
of returns is not statistically different from the 
average returns over the whole sample period. 
Nevertheless, we simulate the action of a trader for 
this case and obtain the results reported in Table 4.
Table 4. Trading simulation results for the PFST 
returns over the period 1997–2018: economic 
force majeure events, 1α =
Number 
of trades, 
units
Number of 
successful 
trades, unit
Number of 
successful 
trades, %
Profit, 
%
Profit % 
per trade
8 4 50.0% 4.3% 0.5%
As can be seen, the percentage of successful trades 
is 50% and profit per trade are close to the aver-
age return for the full sample, which suggests 
that these results do not differ from the random 
ones. As a further check a t-test is carried out (see 
Table 5), which again leads to the same conclusion. 
Therefore, there is no evidence of abnormal profits 
based on exploiting the occurrence of economic 
force majeure events.
Table 5. T-test for evaluating the success of the 
trading strategy: PFST returns over the period 
1997–2018, economic force majeure, 1α =
Parameter Value
Number of the trades 8
Total profit 4.32%
Average profit per trade 0.54%
Standard deviation 1.25%
t-test 1.22
t-critical (0.95) 1.78
Null Hypothesis Not rejected
The results of the cumulative abnormal returns ap-
proach for the case of social force majeure and ter-
rorist acts in Ukraine during the period 1991–2018 
are presented in Table 6.
Table 6. Cumulative abnormal returns for the 
PFST returns over the period 1991–2018: social 
force majeure and terrorist acts
Parameter/ 
period α 1 2 3 5 10
Mean abnormal 
return across force 
majeure event on 
day α
–0.78% 0.78% 2.34% 1.22% 0.71%
Cumulative abnormal 
return across event 
observations from 
1
α  to day 2α
–6.27%–0.07% 18.62% 26.44%43.21%
Average cumulative 
abnormal return 
across event 
observations from 
1
α  to day 
2
α
–0.78%–0.01% 2.33% 3.30% 5.40%
The results are very similar to those for the eco-
nomic force majeure events: negative returns are 
observed only on the day of event (not for any oth-
er time horizon). The t-test results are presented 
in Table 7. 
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Table 7. T-test for the PFST returns over the 
period 1991–2018: social force majeure and 
terrorist acts
Parameter/
period α 1 2 3 5 10
Mean return across 
force majeure 
event on day α –0.73% 0.05% 0.83% 0.71% 0.59%
Standard deviation 
of returns across 
force majeure 
event on day α
1.99% 2.49% 3.49% 3.04% 2.93%
Mean return for 
the whole data set 
0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
Standard deviation 
of returns for the 
whole data set 
1.96% 1.96% 1.96% 1.96% 1.96%
The size of the data 
set across force 
majeure event on 
day α
8 16 24 40 80
The size of the 
whole data set
5,226 5,226 5,226 5,226 5,226
t-criterion –1.11 0.00 0.63 0.61 0.52
t-critical (0.95) 1.89 1.75 1.71 1.68 1.66
Null Hypothesis Not rejected
Not 
rejected
Not 
rejected
Not 
rejected
Not 
rejected
The Null Hypothesis is not rejected in any case, i.e. 
the behavior of returns after social force majeure 
and terrorist acts does not statistically differ from 
the usual one. 
To test Hypothesis 2, the time horizon 1α =  is 
used (this is the only case when a negative reaction 
was observed). The results are presented in Table 8.
Table 8. Trading simulation results for the PFST 
returns over the period 1991–2018: social force 
majeure and terrorist acts, 1α =
Number 
of trades 
units
Number of 
successful 
trades unit
Number of 
successful 
trades %
Profit. 
%
Profit 
% per 
trade
8 6 75.0% 5.9% 0.7%
There is a high percentage of successful trades, 
namely 75%, but profit per trade is close to the 
mean return, which is evidence in favor of the 
randomness of the results. A t-test confirms that 
there are no statistical differences between these 
trading results and those from random trading, i.e. 
Hypothesis 2 is rejected.
Table 9. T-test for evaluating the success of the 
trading strategy: PFST returns over the period 
1991–2018, social force majeure and terrorist 
acts, period 1α =
Parameter Value
Number of the trades 8
Total profit 5.86%
Average profit per trade 0.73%
Standard deviation 1.87%
t-test 1.11
t-critical (0.95) 1.78
Null Hypothesis Not rejected
The results of the cumulative abnormal returns 
approach for the case of natural disasters are pre-
sented in Table 10.
Table 10. Cumulative abnormal returns for the 
PFST returns over the period 1991–2018: natural 
disasters
Parameter/
period α  1 2 3 5 10
Mean abnormal 
return across force 
majeure event on 
day α  
–0.57% 2.94% 14.20% 8.09% 24.10%
Cumulative 
abnormal return 
across event 
observations from 
1
α  to day 2α
–0.14% 0.74% 3.55% 2.02% 6.02%
Average cumulative 
abnormal return 
across event 
observations from 
1
α  to day 2α
–0.14% 0.88% 2.81% –0.10% 1.00%
As in the previous cases (economic force majeure 
and social force majors/terrorist acts), Hypothesis 1 
is not rejected only for the day of the force majeure 
event, whilst there is no evidence of negative returns 
for any other time horizons. A t-test indicates that 
H1 is rejected even for 1α =  (see Table 11).
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Table 11. T-test for the PFST returns over the 
period 1991–2018: case of natural disasters
Parameter/
period α 1 2 3 5 10
Mean return 
across force 
majeure event on 
day α –0.09% 0.42% 1.24% 0.46% 0.65%
Standard 
deviation of 
returns across 
force majeure 
event on day α
1.27% 1.57% 2.74% 2.51% 2.53%
Mean return for 
the whole data 
set 
0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
Standard 
deviation of 
returns for the 
whole data set 
1.96% 1.96% 1.96% 1.96% 1.96%
The size of the 
data set across 
force majeure 
event on day α 4 8 12 20 40
The size of the 
whole data set 5,226 5,226 5,226 5,226 5,226
t-criterion –0.23 0.47 0.86 0.32 0.48
t-critical (0.95) 2.13 1.89 1.75 1.71 1.68
Null Hypothesis Not rejected
Not 
rejected
Not 
rejected
Not 
rejected
Not 
rejected
The results of the trading strategy for 1α =  are 
presented in Table 12.
Table 12. Trading simulation results for the PFST 
returns over the period 1991–2018: natural 
disasters, 1α =
Number 
of trades, 
units
Number of 
successful 
trades, unit
Number of 
successful 
trades, %
Profit, 
%
Profit 
% per 
trade
4 1 25.0% 0.4% 0.1%
Only 25% of the trades are successful, and profit 
per trade is less than the mean return. The t-test 
statistics implies that these results are not statisti-
cally different from the random ones (see Table 13). 
Table 13. T-test for evaluating the success of the 
trading strategy: PFST returns over the period 
1991–2018, natural disasters, 1α =
Parameter Value
Number of the trades 4
Total profit 0.36%
Average profit per trade 0.09%
Standard deviation 1.10%
t-test 0.17
t-critical (0.95) 1.78
Null Hypothesis Not rejected
Finally, the results of the cumulative abnormal re-
turns approach in the case of technological disas-
ters are displayed in Table 14.
Table 14. Cumulative abnormal returns for 
the PFST returns over the period 1991–2018: 
technological disasters 
Parameter/
period α  1 2 3 5 10
Mean abnormal 
return across force 
majeure event on 
day α
0.00% –0.33% 0.19% –0.14% –0.11%
Cumulative 
abnormal return 
across event 
observations from 
1
α  to day 
2
α
–0.01% –6.88% –2.82% –22.60%–44.04%
Average 
cumulative 
abnormal return 
across event 
observations from 
1
α  to day 
2
α
0.00% –0.33% –0.13% –1.08% –2.10%
In this case, unlike the previous ones, there is no pat-
tern in price behavior on the day of the event, and 
the longer the time horizon the higher cumulative 
abnormal returns are. To see whether the detected 
differences in returns are statistically significant a 
t-test is again performed (see Table 15). The null hy-
pothesis is rejected only for the case of 10.α =  
Table 15. T-test for the PFST returns over the 
period 1991–2018: technological disasters
Parameter/
period α  1 2 3 5 10
Mean return 
across force 
majeure event 
on day α 0.05% –0.11% 0.01% –0.16% –0.16%
Standard 
deviation of 
returns across 
force majeure 
event on day α
1.88% 1.73% 1.76% 1.73% 1.70%
Mean return for 
the whole data 
set 
0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05% 0.05%
Standard 
deviation of 
returns for the 
whole data set 
1.96% 1.96% 1.96% 1.96% 1.96%
The size of the 
data set across 
force majeure 
event on day α 21 42 63 105 210
The size of the 
whole data set 5,226 5,226 5,226 5,226 5,226
t-criterion 0.00 –0.61 –0.20 –1.25 –1.74
t-critical (0.95) 1.73 1.68 1.67 1.66 1.65
Null Hypothesis Not rejected
Not 
rejected
Not 
rejected
Not 
rejected Rejected
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To find out whether this abnormal behavior provides 
opportunities to “beat the market” a trading simula-
tion approach is used once more. The results for the 
time horizon 10α =  are shown in Table 16.
Table 16. Trading simulation results for the PFST 
returns over the period 1991–2018: natural 
disasters, 10α =
Number 
of trades, 
units
Number of 
successful 
trades, unit
Number of 
successful 
trades, %
Profit, 
%
Profit 
% per 
trade
21 12 57.1% 33.2% 1.6%
The number of successful trades is close to the 60% 
and profit per trade is three times higher than the 
average return. However, the t-test statistic (see 
Table 17) implies that these results are not statisti-
cally different from the random ones. 
Table 17. T-test for the trading strategy 
effectiveness evaluation: PFST returns over the 
period 1991–2018, natural disasters, 1α =
Parameter Value
Number of the trades 21
Total profit 33.15%
Average profit per trade 1.58%
Standard deviation 5.68%
t-test 1.27
t-critical (0.95) 1.78
Null Hypothesis Not rejected
The results of the tests for the Hypothesis 1 and 2 
are summarized in Tables 18 and 19, respectively.
Table 18. Overall results for Hypothesis 1*
Group of force majeure/
period α  1 2 3 5 10
Economic force majeure +/– – – – –
Social force majeure and 
terrorist acts +/– – – – –
Natural disasters +/– – – – –
Technological disasters – +/– +/– +/– +
Note: * “+” – Hypothesis 1 is confirmed and differences are 
statistically significant; “+/–” – Hypothesis 1 is not rejected but 
differences are not statistically significant; “–” – Hypothesis 1 
is rejected.
Table 19. Overall results for Hypothesis 2*
Group of force majeure/
period α  1 2 3 5 10
Economic force majeure +/– – – – –
Social force majeure and terrorist 
acts +/– – – – –
Natural disasters – – – – –
Technological disasters – – – – +/–
Note: * “+” – Hypothesis 2 is not rejected and results differ 
from random ones; “+/–” – Hypothesis 2 is not rejected but 
results do not differ from random ones; “–” – Hypothesis 2 
is rejected.
CONCLUSION
This paper examines price behavior in the Ukrainian stock market after four types of force majeure 
events (economic force majeure, social force majeure, terrorist acts, natural and technological dis-
asters. Using daily data for the PFTS index (the main index of the Ukrainian stock market) for the 
period from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2018 two different hypotheses are tested: force majeure 
events create temporary inefficiencies in the Ukrainian stock market (H1), and trading strategies 
based on force majeure events can generate abnormal profits (H2). For this purpose, a variety of 
methods are used, including cumulative abnormal returns and trading simulation approaches, as 
well as Student’s t-tests. 
On the whole, it appears that the Ukrainian stock market absorbs new information rather fast. Negative 
returns in most cases are observed only on the day of the event. The behavior of returns on other days 
shows no sign of abnormality. The only exception is technological disasters, possibly because it is harder 
for agents to evaluate their consequences and incorporate them into stock prices. 
Further, the trading simulation analysis implies that, despite the presence of a specific pattern in price 
behavior after force majeure events (namely a decrease on the day of the event), it is not possible to de-
vise trading strategies exploiting it that generate abnormal profits: the results from apparently success-
ful strategies are not statistically different from the random trading ones. 
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APPENDIX A
Table A1. The main economic force majeure events in Ukraine during 1991–2018
Force majeure Description Date
Bankruptcy of the bank 
“Nadra”
Because of insolvency of the bank, the amount of payments from the Guarantee 
Fund for Individuals’ Deposits is UAH 3.6 billion
February 6, 
2015
Bankruptcy of DeltaBank Because of insolvency of the bank, the amount of payments from the Guarantee Fund for Individuals’ Deposits and state loses is UAH 24 billion March 3, 2015
Nationalization of 
Privatbank
According to the decision of the government and the National Security and 
Defense Council, PrivatBank became the property of the state for UAH 1; the 
capital requirement at the time of nationalization amounted to UAH 148 billion, 
the amount of issued Eurobonds was USD 595 million
December 18, 
2016
Hacker attack on 
government sites in 
Ukraine
Due to the mass hacking attack on government sites (the State Treasury of 
Ukraine and others) and the network of state authorities there were mass delays in 
payments. To protect against hackers, the Government of Ukraine allocated UAH 
80 million
December 6, 
2016
Bankruptcy of 
“PlatinumBank”
Due to insufficient level of capital, the bank is declared as bankrupt, the amount of 
losses of state-owned enterprises – clients of the bank is 500 million UAH
January 11, 
2017
“Petya” virus attack
Due to the large-scale virus cyberattacking through the software of M.E.Doc. 
installed on 1 million computers, the estimated losses for the Ukrainian economy 
are 0.5% of GDP. The largest enterprises and institutions of Ukraine were the 
Boryspil airport, Ukrtelecom, Ukrposhta, Oschadbank, Ukrzaliznytsya and others
June 27, 2017
Bankruptcy of insurance 
company “Dominanta”
Due to the insolvency of the company included in the 10 largest insurance 
companies of Ukraine, outstanding obligations to customers remain at the amount 
of UAH 98 million, 300 thousand of civil liability laws remained unprotected
August 12, 
2018
Bankruptcy of PJSC “Black 
Sea Shipbuilding Plant”
According to the court decision PJSC “Black Sea Shipbuilding Plant”, the largest 
enterprise in Ukraine and Europe, which was founded in 1897, was declared 
bankrupt after unsuccessful and lengthy sanation procedures
July 4, 2018
APPENDIX B
Table B1. The main social, military and political force majeure events and terrorist acts in Ukraine 
during 1991–2018
Force majeure Description Date
“Orange Revolution”, Kyiv, 
etc. regional centers
Because of numerous falsifications in the second round of elections, an all-
Ukrainian protest rally began, which resulted in a significant change in the political 
vector in the country
November 22, 
2004
“Revolution of dignity”, 
Kyiv, etc. regional centers
As a result of the failure of signing the Association Agreement with the EU, the 
rejection of the policy of the government began mass protests
November 21, 
2013 
Power breaking of 
EuroMaydan, Kyiv
Because of illegal actions of power units, in particular, “Berkut” on cleaning the 
Independence Square from protesters, 79 people were injured
November 30, 
2013
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Force majeure Description Date
“Bloody Thursday”, Kyiv
As a result of the confrontation of power units and protesters, 105 people were 
killed (as of April 10, 2014), 1,500 people were injured, hundreds were declared as 
missing
February 20, 
2014
Crimean annexation
Because of the pseudo-referendum, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was 
included in the RF and secured an illegal annexation of the Crimea. The date of 
the beginning of occupation of Crimea by the RF Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine was 
recognized on February 22, 2014
March 16, 
2014
The beginning of the 
Russian military aggression 
against Ukraine
Terrorists captured Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. As a result of attempts to capture a 
military unit in Mariupol (April 16, 2014) and fighting in Sloviansk (April 17, 2014), 7 
people were killed and 16 were injured
April 12, 2014
Malaysia Airlines Boeing 
777 aircraft shot down
Because of the terrorist attack, carried out with the help of an anti-aircraft missile 
complex “Beech” of Russian production, 298 people from the 16 countries died, 
primarily the Netherlands and Malaysia. The terrorist attack is qualified as the largest 
in Ukraine and the most deadly for civil aviation. After the terrorist attack, a wave of 
sanctions against the Russian Federation began in 41 countries of the world
July 17, 2014
“Ilovaisky pocket”
As a result of the insidious actions of the pro-Russian military forces during the exit 
from the boiler on the march, 366 soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine  died, 
429 people were wounded, 300 people – were captured. The amount of losses 
exceeded 70 million UAH (according to the data of the General Prosecutor’s Office 
of Ukraine from August 14, 2017)
August 29, 
2014
APPENDIX C
Table C1. The main natural disasters in Ukraine during 1991–2018
Force majeure Description Date
Flood in Transcarpathian 
region in 1998
Due to the heavy rains of the Tisza, Borzhava, Latoritsa and others, rivers came out 
of the coast and flooded 120 settlements. 350 thousand people were recognized 
as flood victims, 17 people died, 20 thousand people were resettled, 40793 were 
flooded, the amount of losses exceeded 820 million UAH. On November 7, 1998 the 
territory of the oblast was declared a zone of emergency ecological situation
November 
3-5, 1998
Flood in the 
Precarpathians, 
Carpathians, 
Transcarpathia
Due to heavy rains on July 31, 2008, territories of 6 western regions were declared 
as zones of emergency ecological situation, rivers Prut, Dniester and others left the 
banks. 30 people died, 40,601 dwelling houses flooded, the amount of losses is more 
than 4 billion UAH
July 28, 2008 
Flood in Transcarpathian 
region in 2017
Due to heavy rains and snow, the level of water on the rivers of Transcarpathia 
exceeded the level during the 1998 flood, 1023 households were flooded, 1 person 
died, 146 people evacuated
December 
13-18, 2017
Anomalous heat in 
Ukraine
As a result of the action of the anticyclone, the climatic indicators of a number of 
areas of the West and the Center of Ukraine exceeded the norm by 5-10 degrees 
Celsius, 3 people died
August 3-6, 
2017
APPENDIX D
Table D1. The main technological disasters in Ukraine during 1991–2018
Force majeure Description Date
Accident during the celebration of the 60th 
anniversary of 14 AK in Sknyliv airfield, Lviv region
Because of the fall of the Su-27UB fighter aircraft, 77 people 
(28 of them – children) were killed in a crowd of spectators, 
more than 250 people were injured. The accident is 
qualified as the largest catastrophe in the airshow of the 
number of dead
July 27,  
2002
Explosions of artillery shells at the warehouses 
of the 52nd mechanized brigade of the 6th Army 
Corps of the Southern Operational Command of the 
Army Land Forces in Artemivsk, Donetsk region
Because of the explosions of shells, 10 warehouses from 
17 were destroyed, 66 apartment buildings and 120 private 
houses, five schools and three hospitals were damaged, two 
people were injured
October 10, 
2003 
Explosions of artillery shells in the warehouses of 
the military unit A-2985 with Novobohdanivka, 
Zaporizhzhia region
As a result of the explosions of shells, 90 thousand tons 
of munitions (“Grad”, “Smerch” and “Hurricane”) were 
destroyed and 1.5 thousand people were evacuated, 5 
people died, 81 persons were traumatized by various 
degrees of severity, 22 houses were destroyed
May 6, 2004
Table B1 (cont). The main social, military and political force majeure events and terrorist acts in 
Ukraine during 1991–2018
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Table D1 (cont.). The main technological disasters in Ukraine during 1991–2018
Force majeure Description Date
Explosions of artillery shells at the warehouses 
of the 275th ammunition storage base in 
Novobohdanivka, Zaporizhzhia region
Due to the high temperature of the air, detonation of the 
shells of one of the warehouses took place, and 5 persons 
were injured
July 23,  
2005
The accident at the housing and communal services 
facilities in the city of Alchevsk, Luhansk region
As a result of the accident and false actions of communal 
services, 60 thousand people were left without heating, an 
emergency situation at the state level was announced
January 22, 
2006
Explosions of artillery shells at the warehouses 
of the 275th ammunition storage base in 
Novobohdanivka, Zaporizhzhia region
As a result of the explosions, the fire captured more than 
3 hectares of the territory of the compound, 1,5 thousand 
people were evacuated, 4 thousand people were displaced, 
4 were injured
August 9, 
2006 
Explosions of artillery shells at the warehouses 
of the 275th ammunition storage base in 
Novobohdanivka, Zaporizhzhia region
As a result of mine clearance of warehouses and explosions 
already injured by preliminary fires of shells, 1 person was 
wounded, 2 people were killed
May 18,  
2007
The leakage of phosphorus and fire on the railway 
under Ozhid village, Lviv region
The accident at the freight train № 2005 on the Reds-
Ozhidov run, which resulted in the transfer of 15 tanks with 
yellow phosphorus, spontaneous combustion of 6 tanks and 
injured 152 people (including 42 children)
July 16,  
2007
The explosion of gas in a residential building in 
Dnipropetrovsk
Because of the explosion, the entrance of the dwelling 
house was completely destroyed, and three neighboring 
ones were damaged. 23 people were killed, 20 were injured
October 13, 
2007
Accident at the mine named after Zasiadko, 
Donetsk
As a result of the explosion of air-methane mixture on the 
horizon of 1078, 100 people died
November 
18, 2007
Explosions of shells in the warehouses of the 
military part of 0829, 61st Arsenal of the Southern 
Operational Command of the Army, and fire at the 
gas distribution station of Lozova, Kharkiv region
Because of explosions evacuated people in the 3-km zone, 
1 person was injured.
August 27, 
2008
Fire at the station “Otradnoe”, Dzhankoy district 
(ARC Crimea) at the station for storage of pesticides
Because of the fire, an area of 600 m2 burned about 160 
tons of pesticides.
October 17, 
2009
The explosion at the hospital № 7 in the city of 
Luhansk
As a result of the explosion of an oxygen cylinder in the 
intensive care unit, 16 people were killed
January 18, 
2010
Explosion of the gas pipeline in Uzhhorod, 
Transcarpathian region
As a result of the explosion, 1 person was killed, 2 were 
injured
August 29, 
2011
 Fire at Vuglegirsk eneggy station (PJSC 
“Tsentrenergo”), Svitlodarsk, Donetsk region
As a result of the fire, 4 power units of TPP were destroyed 
by 1 person, 5 people were injured, 12 thousand residents 
of Svitlodarsk city were left without water and heating
March 29, 
2013
Accident at the chemical plant of PJSC “Stirol”, city 
of Horlivka, Donetsk region
The largest accident at chemical plants during the years of 
independence, which resulted in the release of ammonia, 6 
people killed injured 26.
August 6, 
2013
Accident at the mine named after Zasiadko, 
Donetsk
As a result of the explosion of the methane mixture on the 
eastern slope No. 2, 100 people were killed
March 4, 
2015
Explosions of shells at the depots of the Ministry of 
Defense of Ukraine in the Svatov, Luhansk region
Because of explosions, 59 multistory buildings, 581 private 
houses and 21 social facilities were damaged, and four 
people were killed. The Ministry of Defense qualifies as a 
terrorist act
October 29, 
2015
Accident at the Steppe mine,  Glukhiv village, Lviv 
region
As a result of the explosion of methane mixture on the 
horizon of 550 m, 119 conveyor bombers killed 8 people 
and injured 23 people
March 2, 
2017
Explosions of shells at the depots of the Ministry of 
Defense of Ukraine in the city of Balakliia, Kharkiv 
region
Because of explosions, 2 people died, 5 people were 
injured, 300 houses were damaged, 5 were destroyed. The 
Ministry of Defense qualifies as a terrorist act
March 23, 
2017
Explosions of shells in the warehouses 48 of the 
arsenal of military unit A1119 in the Kalynivka 
village, Vinnytsia region
Because of the bombings, 2 people were injured, 24 people 
were evacuated 5 people, 300 buildings were damaged, 
5 were destroyed. Qualifies as a sabotage of the Russian 
Federation.
September 
26, 2017
